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Abstract—Device reliability is often considered essential to
the performance of a wave energy converter. Developers may
undertake a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) as a
design process to evaluate the high priority failure modes of
a prototype to approximate device reliability. However, failures
identified by this process are typically predicted, and often lack
validation from actual marine operations history. In view of this,
an FMEA undertaken for the Albatern Squid 6 Series Wave
Energy Converter (WEC) has been validated using historical
failure rate and marine operations data. Results indicate that a
high volume of major structural and hydraulic failures occurred
in the initial stages of deployment, whilst minor electrical and
instrumentation failures occurred towards the latter. A notable
observation is that human driven failures constituted a much
larger portion of failure occurrences than the FMEA predicted.
As a general observation, the retrospective analysis of failure
rate requires consistent data recording procedures, especially
given the introduction of new innovations, which may cause a
resurgence of early-stage faults. Lessons learned in the operation
of a redundant, modular and accessible array are discussed in
the view of designing devices that are not immune, but resilient
to failure.
Index Terms—Lessons Learned, Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis, Failure Log, Deployment History, Wave Energy Array
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Failure and Reliability of Wave Energy Converters
The reliability of Wave Energy Converters (WEC) has
long been identified as a key development metric, and has
retained its place of priority amongst wave energy research
across the last decade [1] to current state of the art [2].
In the most recent UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC)
report, reliability has consistently been identified as an Energy
Technologies Institute (ETI) priority activity.
Device developers are often required to demonstrate careful
consideration of device reliability, availability and maintain-
ability. Technology-specific funding bodies such as Wave
Energy Scotland (WES) and the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) address these principles as an integral part
of the funding application [3] or technical appraisal process
[4]. In NREL’s Structured Innovation system, being reliable,
durable and survivable are counted amongst the functions
required for a successful Wave Energy Farm.
In lieu of historical failure rate data, design processes such
as a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) may be used
to provide estimates for device reliability. Simply stated, an
FMEA is undertaken to identify the likely failure modes of
a functional system, once identified, risks are attributed a
probability, consequence and detection ranking to determine
their overall risk priority level. FMEAs have been conducted
for a number of wave energy converters, including two exam-
ples of attenuators; hemi-spherical buoys attached to a hinged
mechanical arm [5], [6], and a point absorber; a floating buoy
connected to a linear rack and pinion mechanism [7].
The application of these FMEAs typically involve a feed-
back to the design process of the WEC in question. Ambuehl
uses the Wavestar FMEA to design for structural reliability [5],
whilst Chandrasekan is prompted to revise a Power Take Off
(PTO) configuration to remove high-failure rate components
and improve overall reliability [7]. Okoros FMEA differs in
approach by using weighted parameters to reduce subjectivity
in attributing risk rankings, this allows for the prioritisation of
components for inspection, repair and maintenance [6].
One notable aspect of Okoros FMEA is that the parameters
contain information regarding operating conditions; the current
and projected status of each component is taken into account
in the risk ranking calculation, hence the model can be updated
from inspection findings. This prompts the idea of validating
perceived failure probability and consequence rankings with
actual marine operations data. By following this principle, the
FMEA is revised and is able to reflect more realistic operating
conditions of the device.
B. Lessons Learned Approach
Prior to this study, an FMEA has been conducted for
Albatern’s Squid 6S WEC [8], this investigation led to the
identification of 271 independent failure modes for 112 unique
components and sub-assemblies. In particular, the high and
Fig. 1. Squid 6 Series WEC System Block Model - Division into Sub-Assemblies
medium priority failure modes identified were used to inform
sensor selection for a Condition Monitoring System (CMS).
Additional useful outputs included recommended design alter-
ations, a set of Risk Based Inspection (RBI) protocols and a
list of critical sub-systems and priority components.
However, this predicted list of failure events has not been
validated with real prototype data. In the interest of capturing
the lessons learned from 3 years of marine operations history,
a historical failure log has been diligently compiled using the
relevant information available.
From a project management perspective, experience in the
industry has demonstrated a significant opportunity to learn
from the installation, operations and maintenance of a wave
energy array [9], where the evaluation of success and failure
throughout the project lifecycle can enable an improved de-
velopment trajectory. From a reliability-centered perspective,
learning from the common modes of failure over the course of
various wave energy prototype deployments allows for a more
refined approach in component reliability testing [10]. With
a ’lessons learned’ approach in mind, this paper attempts to
draw more general observations and learnings from 3 years
of failure, with the ultimate goal of improved reliability and
technology robustness.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
An FMEA was set up under the guidance document DNV-
RP-2013 Qualification of a New Technology [11], this is
described fully in [8]. In accordance with the DNV risk
categories, Probability and Consequence rankings were given
a value of 1-5, whilst a Detection ranking of 1-4 was added.
This gave a maximum Risk Priority Number (RPN) of 100.
Due to the small-size of the Squid 6S, the risk matrix required
adjustment to maintain appropriateness for the scale of the
technology. A design life of 20 years was chosen with an
average project size of 6 devices; corresponding to the existing
Mingary Bay wave array.
The FMEA was undertaken for a 7.5kW Squid 6 Series
device, an articulated wave energy converter that employs a
hydraulic PTO to convert the motion of its buoyant arms into
electricity. As waves pass over the device, pumping modules
convert rotational motion into a reciprocating linear motion
by a series of mechanical linkages connected to a hydraulic
cylinder, this pumping action sends pressurised hydraulic fluid
to a high pressure accumulator and hydraulic motor, located in
one of the outer buoyancy floats (Antinodes). A full breakdown
of a Squid 6 Series unit is depicted in Figure 1, where the
device is categorised into its constituent assemblies.
A single Squid 6S device may be divided into its Moor-
ings, Structure, Hydraulic, Electrical and Instrumentation sub-
assemblies. In doing so, the components of each sub-assembly
may be systematically addressed for each possible failure
mechanism. The System Block Model further shows the
interdependencies of each sub-system, and illustrates where
sub-assemblies may be critical to the production of electricity.
As described in Section I-B, a total of 271 risks have been
ranked for the device.
B. Failure Log
In order to facilitate the collection and analysis of reliability
data, the US Department of Defense provides guidance for
the use of the Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective
Action System (FRACAS) [12]. The purpose of FRACAS is
to provide information on what component has failed, how
and why it failed and what may be done to eliminate future
failures.
In the interest of comparing historical failure records to the
FMEA, a failure recording template identical to the FMEA
was used in the recording of marine operations failures. This
ensured a coherent and comprehensive format for collected
data for comparison to the FMEA. As this method was not in
place during the marine operations, data from marine opera-
tions reports, operations change logs and internal consultation
was used to populate the failure log template retrospectively.
Example failure log entries are displayed on Figure 2.
C. Deployment History
In conjunction with the compilation of the Failure Log, the
entirety of Albatern’s marine operations history has been con-
solidated into a single document. The deployment history may
be found on Figure 4, which displays the site of deployment
and device status of each Squid 6S unit. Over the course of
3 years, Albatern has undertaken 3 major deployments on the
West Coast of Scotland:
1) Isle of Muck Aquaculture Project, 2014
2) Loch Kishorn WaveNET Expansion, 2015
3) Mingary Bay Pathfinder Project, 2016 until present
In 2014, marine operation activity was focused in the North-
West Highland region, in a sheltered sea-loch, where the first
batch of Squid 6 Series units were deployed for initial trials.
Following this, a total of 3 devices were deployed near the Isle
of Muck in a triangular mooring pattern. These devices were
subsequently retrieved, undergoing a period of maintenance
until a total of 6 devices were deployed in an expanded
grid layout in Loch Kishorn, 2015. Finally, the Squids were
transported to Glenmore Bay (Figure 3, on the West Coast of
Scotland, in preparation for a grid-connected deployment in
Mingary Bay beginning August 2016.
Fig. 3. Squid 6S at Glenmore Bay
Using the information available, the Deployment History
was used in conjunction with the failure log to derive:
1) Time to Failure - Number of days until failure occurence
2) Time to Detect - Number of days until failure detected
3) Time to Repair - Total active repair time
Fig. 4. Squid 6S Deployment History
Fig. 2. Failure Log - A Sample of Squid 6 Series Failure Occurrences Recorded in Retrospect
III. RESULTS
A. FMEA Vs. Failure Log
1) Common Failure Modes: Table I denotes the common
failure modes as observed in the FMEA [8], and displays
failures experienced in the field emboldened. Fortunately, no
significant mooring failures were experienced, however, major
failures occurred within the structural and hydraulic assem-
blies, whilst minor failures were experienced by the electrical
and instrumentation sub-systems. The occurence of minor
failures associated with the electrical and instrumentation sub-
systems persisted in Mingary Bay after the installation of the
V3 Power Take Off module.
TABLE I
COMMON FAILURE MODES (ACTUAL OCCURRENCES EMBOLDENED
Moorings Structural
Loss of pretension Loss of watertight integrity
Entanglement Hull breach
Drags from position Structural failure
Structural failure Deformation / yielding
Incorrect orientation Disconnection
Hydraulic Electrical
Seal failure Electrical short
Hose burst Connector fault
Water ingress Generator failure
Oil leakage Electrical overload
Valve jams shut/open Battery failure
Instrumentation
Calibration error
False alarm
Software fault
Intermittent output
Communications failure
2) Root Causes of Failure: Table II lists the number of
instances a root cause appears in the FMEA, in comparison to
the number of instances the root cause has been attributed to
failure in the Failure Log. The sub-totals have been normalised
against the total number of failures, whilst the difference
between the predicted (FMEA) and actual (Failure Log) root
causes is taken. This difference is ranked, leading to Figures
5 and 6, which essentially show the discrepancy between the
number of predicted and actual failures.
In Figure 5 corrosion, fatigue and wear are amongst the
most over predicted failures. However, these failure mecha-
nisms typically come into effect during the latter stages of a
components service life, hence suggesting why they have not
occurred in such volumes as the FMEA would suggest. On the
other hand, Figure 6 displays the most under predicted failures,
three of which may be attributed to human error; design faults
and assembly errors. Overall, human error accounts for 17.7%
of FMEA failures, and 27% of failures recorded in the Failure
Log, indicating a propensity for unpredictable, yet inevitable
mistakes in the design, commissioning and operations and
maintenance processes. It is also worth noting the difficulty
in predicting design faults.
The number of failures driven by unexpected service loads
greatly skews Figure 6, this is a result of an ambitious hose
burst protection system used in the Isle of Muck deployment.
Due to a series of anti-burst measures, hydraulic lock ups
occurred, causing extreme loading on the structural members
of the Pumping Module sub-assembly. As a result, several
breakages and deformations of components were experienced.
However, with the retrofit of the V2 and V3 manifold blocks
in subsequent deployments, major structural failures have been
mitigated.
TABLE II
ROOT CAUSES OF FAILURE: FMEA VS. FAILURE LOG
Root Cause of Failure FMEA % Log % change
Corrosion 25 9.2% 3 3.4% -5.9%
Wear 30 11.1% 8 9.0% -2.1%
Service Limit State SLS 16 5.9% 4 4.5% -1.4%
Fatigue Limit State FLS 10 3.7% 1 1.1% -2.6%
Ultimate Limit State ULS 6 2.2% 2 2.2% 0.0%
Accident Limit State ALS 1 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4%
Insufficient lubrication 1 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4%
Overheating 1 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4%
Bolt loosening 11 4.1% 0 0.0% -4.1%
Malicious damage 4 1.5% 0 0.0% -1.5%
Vibration fatigue 2 0.7% 0 0.0% -0.7%
Calibration error 1 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4%
Connector failure 4 1.5% 2 2.2% 0.8%
Electrical short 12 4.4% 4 4.5% 0.1%
Insulation failure 4 1.5% 0 0.0% -1.5%
Lightning strike 2 0.7% 0 0.0% -0.7%
Loss of power 8 3.0% 2 2.2% -0.7%
Loss of communications 0 0.0% 1 1.1% 1.1%
Conducting debris 3 1.1% 0 0.0% -1.1%
Software design fault 2 0.7% 3 3.4% 2.6%
Overcurrent 8 3.0% 0 0.0% -3.0%
Moisture ingress 12 4.4% 4 4.5% 0.1%
Design fault 6 2.2% 6 6.7% 4.5%
Unexpected service loads 17 6.3% 20 22.5% 16.2%
Poor installation 18 6.6% 6 6.7% 0.1%
Maintenance fault 3 1.1% 2 2.2% 1.1%
Manufacturing defect 5 1.8% 2 2.2% 0.4%
Fabrication / Assembly error 2 0.7% 4 4.5% 3.8%
Material degradation 20 7.4% 5 5.6% -1.8%
Contamination - debris 6 2.2% 1 1.1% -1.1%
Contamination - moisture 3 1.1% 3 3.4% 2.3%
Contamination - air 2 0.7% 0 0.0% -0.7%
Underpressure 0 0.0% 2 2.2% 2.2%
Overpressure 7 2.6% 2 2.2% -0.3%
Miscibility 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0.0%
Entanglement 2 0.7% 0 0.0% -0.7%
Biofouling - airbourne 1 0.4% 0 0.0% -0.4%
Marine growth - subsea 5 1.8% 1 1.1% -0.7%
Ship impacts 7 2.6% 1 1.1% -1.5%
Foreign body impacts 4 1.5% 0 0.0% -1.5%
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3) Risk Priority Number Distribution: Figures 7 and 8
depict the risk ranking of failure instances for each sub-
assembly, according to the FMEA and the Failure Log. Again,
the structural failures experienced in the Isle of Muck skew
the data; where there is typically a greater proportion of very
low and low risks, in the failure log an equal number of
high risk failures are recorded. The total number of high
Fig. 5. Overpredicted Failure Mechanisms by Percentage of Total
Fig. 6. Underpredicted Failure Mechanisms by Percentage of Total
Fig. 7. FMEA Risk Rankings by Sub-Assembly
Fig. 8. Failure Log Risk Rankings by Sub-Assembly
risks may be exaggerated by the Detection ranking; failures
detected beyond one week receive a ranking of 4, resulting
in a significant amount of high risks. Furthermore, as higher
priority failures occur, attention and resources may be drawn
towards diagnosing and fixing them, hence explaining a lack
of very low and low risks failures recorded in the earlier stages
of the failure log.
B. High and Medium Priority Failure
Based upon the high and medium priority failures identified
in the Albatern Squid 6 Series FMEA, an array of sensor
configurations were suggested for the purpose of condition
monitoring [8]. In Tables III and IV the high and medium
priority failures are compared to actual occurrences recorded
in the failure log.
With regards to the high priority failures displayed in Table
III, the actual occurrence of significant failures is varied.
For example, major hydrualic failures were predicted in the
Low Pressure Antinode and PTO module, however in reality
only minor and isolated leakage incidents occurred. Although
significant mooring failures were anticipated, no significant
change to the mooring pattern was experienced, however the
minor failure of connecting straps occurred very often. The
high priority electrical failures predicted were as a result of
their probability, although connector issues were widespread,
their occurrence did not cause severe consequences.
However, due to the structural failures experienced in the
Isle of Muck, a significant amount of structural failures oc-
cured in the pumping module assembly due to unexpected
service loads. Although fastener damage was anticipated,
the extent of the damage to the structural components of
the pumping modules was not predicted. Once more, Table
IV illustrates that several hydraulic failures were anticipated
amongst the PTO module, however in reality, only isolated
contamination incidents have been experienced. This however
does not preclude the occurrence of hydraulic failures later in
the service life of the device.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Data Incompleteness
A few sources of discrepancy may account for the com-
pleteness of the data. This may primarily be attributed to the
lack of disciplined marine operations reporting during the 2014
Isle of Muck deployment. Although the 2015 Loch Kishorn
operations saw an improvement in the consistency of data
collection, reports were still done on a weekly basis. The 2016
Mingary Bay deployment showed a considerably consistent
report with device specific repair information on a daily basis,
however the data still suffers from periodic gaps.
Due to the critical structural failures that occurred through-
out the 2014 Isle of Muck deployment, it appears that there
has been a tendency to overlook minor failures regarding the
electrical and instrumentation systems during this period. This
further points towards the need of having more stringent failure
recording measures.
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B. Increased Early Failures
Due to the constant innovation of the Squid 6 Series
prototype, both electrical and instrumentation issues were
experienced in Kishorn in 2015 and subsequently in Mingary
in 2016. Rather than indicate a constant high failure rate,
it appears a new innovation effect is taking place with the
introduction of a new upgrade. Similar to the upgrade of
Software, the introduction of untested components may result
in an extended infant mortality period, as illustrated on Figure
9, this effect may account for the disproportionate number of
minor failures experienced with the version 2 manifold blocks
and instrumentation installed in Kishorn in 2015, and version
3 Power Take Off modules and fibre optic communications
link installed in Mingary in 2016.
Fig. 9. Illustrative Bathtub Curve with New Innovations
C. Mean Time To Failure
Preliminary work has been undertaken to observe the field
failures occurred in relation to predicted failures. Due to the
poor resolution of data, it was not possible to accurately
predict Mean Time To Failure values for further analysis.
In time, given diligent data collection and recording, more
significant failure rate prediction models will be able to be
developed from the field data gathered.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
In the effort to build on the learning gained from undertak-
ing this study, lessons learned are briefly discussed.
A. Data Recording Procedure
In order to facilitate reliability analysis and optimisation in
the future, tools must be laid down in the present in order to
slowly work towards developing commercial scale industrial
reliability databases. A diligent approach to collecting data
must be taken. These measures should be in place through the
life cycle of the device, from the beginning of deployment,
throughout operations and during retrieval and decommission-
ing. By maintaining the consistency and centralisation of data
collection, the ease of data analysis in hindsight becomes much
less time consuming and demanding of effort.
In addition, where possible, data recording should be un-
dertaken with a minimal precision of 24 hours. By enforcing
stricter document control and operations procedures, operators
are capable of ensuring a higher quality of data gathered.
These measures for recording failure, root cause, consequence
and intervention should be in place for the entire deployment
phase, and will save significant time and effort in the future.
B. Design Principles and Outlook on Marine Operations
1) Redundancy: An advantage of having multiple sub-
assemblies to provide the same function, i.e. transfer energy
to the power take off, allows flexibility during the operations
phase in the number of sub-assemblies that may be permitted
to fail before intervention is required. A favourable aspect of
the Squid WaveNET technology is the redundancy available
on multiple levels; redundancy per device is achieved through
multiple pumping modules, whilst redundancy throughout the
array is achieved by multiple devices.
2) Modularity: Deploying a plurality of devices, rather
than a single prototype, has enabled the acceleration of the
learning process by increasing the probability of component
failure by the number of devices. In view of the failure log, a
range of varied failures has taken place, facilitating learning.
However, a great drawback for modularity is the requirement
to implement a design modification across the entire fleet,
should an adjustment be necessary.
3) Accessibility: Encouraging the accessibility of devices,
and ease of access to critical sub-assemblies for in-situ repair,
has allowed for rapid response to minor failures during the
commissioning and operations phases. In the event of a
more serious repair, ’plug-and-play’ modules that can be
hotswapped with spares have proven useful over a series of
deployments. Due to the high rate of failure of prototype
devices, the ease of quick interventions and ’fire-fighting’ is
extremely important.
C. Failure Resilience Vs. Failure Immunity
Failures in the marine environment are an intrinsic part of
the marine operations process. It is of significant importance to
understand a device’s high priority failure modes and prepare
for them. However, oftentimes device failure may be perceived
negatively as poor engineering, on the contrary, it would seem
natural that the focus of prototype development should shift
from building systems that are immune to failure towards
building systems that are resilient to failure. As such, rather
than avoiding failure altogether, device developers should
prepare for the inevitable, and embrace this learning process.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the reliability of pro-
totypes will naturally improve as teething issues and design
faults are addressed, thus it is not possible to directly ex-
trapolate the reliability of a prototype to predict that of a
commercial device.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study has examined an existing FMEA in contrast with
a Failure Log retrospectively generated from marine operations
reports. Due to the complexity of the Squid 6 Series WEC
system, it is difficult to deduce all possible failure modes in an
accurate manner. However, the FMEA has provided a valuable
approximation of device reliability in lieu of failure rate data.
Now equipped with marine operations experience over the
span of 3 years, it has been possible to validate the FMEA with
actual failure rate data. Though initial unprecedented failures
and teething issues were high, by capturing the knowledge
learned from failure, it is possible to design systems with
improved reliability and robustness to failure.
In view of this, particular attention should be given to
the human drivers of marine operations and device design,
especially in the event of the installation of a new component
or sub-assembly. By implementing simple design processes
such as an FMEA or Fault Tree Analysis, in addition to
thorough documentation and a quality management checklist,
costly and avoidable mistakes can be prevented.
It is hoped that the learnings gained from the Albatern
marine operations history will be beneficial to other device
developers, with the aim of capturing the lessons learned from
failure and designing the next generation of failure resilient
devices.
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